AI Wealth Truth (77): Why "Signals" Matter More Than "Ability" for Your Income
Spence signaling theory: the value of a degree is not knowledge, but proof you can survive selection. It is a costly signal
I. Why do graduates from elite universities earn more? A common answer is: elite schools teach better things. But economics gives a harsher answer.
II. In 1973, Michael Spence proposed signaling theory. His view is: the main value of a degree is not knowledge, but the signal.
III. What is a signal?
IV. A signal is an action that conveys information you cannot directly prove. You cannot directly prove you are smart, diligent, reliable. But you can prove you got into Tsinghua. That diploma signals "I am smart and diligent". A degree is proof.
V. Why do signals work?
VI. Because they are costly. Getting into Tsinghua requires enormous effort. If you are not smart enough or not diligent enough, you cannot pay that cost. Being able to pay the cost is itself proof of ability.
VII. This is a separating equilibrium. High-ability people can afford costly signals. Low-ability people cannot. Signals separate the two groups. Signals filter.
VIII. The counterintuitive part:
IX. The specific knowledge taught in school may not matter. Many people do not use what they learned in college at work. But degrees still have value. Because they prove you can "complete high-difficulty tasks". The process matters more than the content.
X. Degree competition is an arms race. If everyone's degree rises, nobody gains relatively. The screening bar just moves higher. Society spends more resources on signal sending. This is social waste.
XI. What else can signaling theory explain?
XII. Why is an MBA so expensive? Not only because the curriculum is good. The price itself is a signal. "I can afford this tuition" signals financial strength and confidence. Price is part of the signal.
XIII. Why wear formal clothes to interviews? Formal clothes do not make you smarter. But they signal "I take this opportunity seriously" and "I understand workplace rules". Clothing signals attitude.
XIV. Why list achievements on a resume? Achievements like "led a team to grow 50%" cannot be directly verified. But they signal "I can deliver results". A resume is a signal document.
XV. In the AI era, do signals become more important or less?
XVI. On one side, traditional signals are being devalued. Degree inflation. Everyone has a college diploma. AI can help anyone write a beautiful resume. Traditional signals become less differentiating.
XVII. On the other side, new signals are emerging. Portfolios, real projects, public influence. These are harder to fake than degrees. Verifiable achievements become more valuable.
XVIII. AI may help you send signals. Use AI to assist in completing complex projects. Use AI to help you create content and build influence. AI accelerates signal sending.
XIX. How do you build effective signals in the AI era?
XX. 1. Choose signals AI cannot easily replicate. AI can write articles. But "writing one deep article every week for five years" is hard to fake. Consistency and systems are signals AI cannot copy.
XXI. 2. Let outcomes speak. Not only "I can use AI". But "I used AI to build this product, and it has 10,000 users". Verifiable results are the strongest signals.
XXII. 3. Build a public record. GitHub, blogs, social media. A long public record is hard to fake. Your history is your signal.
XXIII. 4. Get scarce endorsements. Certificates or recommendations not everyone can obtain. Reference letters from top people. Industry-recognized honors. Scarcity is the essence of signals.
XXIV. Your income depends not only on your ability. It also depends on whether you can make others believe you have ability. Ability is internal, signals are external. You need both. But in a world with information asymmetry, signals may matter more. In the AI era, traditional signals depreciate. You need new signals that are harder to fake. Prove you are real, consistent, and irreplaceable. That is more valuable than a degree.
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